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Discouraged Borrowers Aftermath of Financial Crisis: 
A UK Context Assessment 
Abstract 
Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the trend of discouragement in the SME’s lending 
market during the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.  It detects the extent to which the 
responses of discouraged firms to improvements in the lending market are lagged. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The results are based on surveys of UK SME Finance Monitor (2011-2016). Probit regression 
models were used to assess the effect of time passed from the financial crisis on the probability 
of discouragement. 
Findings 
The analysis, inter alia, shows that the rate of discouragement has reduced significantly since 
2013. The results highlight the long-term effect of tightened credit supply on SMEs that are 
ready to invest, but hold back because of fear of rejection. 
Practical implications 
The research suggests addressing imperfect information among discouraged SMEs that are 
recuperating from the financial crisis. With the rise of information asymmetry, entrepreneurs 
show a higher level of fear of rejection by financial institutions. The longer the effects of the 
financial crisis exists among entrepreneurs, the longer they self-ration from credit market, 
which subsequently leads to reduced levels of investment, growth, and innovation among 
SMEs.  
Originality/value 
This research fills a gap in the literature of the effect of financial crisis on the latent demand for 
lending. It discusses the long-term effect of tightened credit supply among entrepreneurs even 
though the supply side has recuperated and recommenced pre-crisis activities. 






This research seeks to add to our understanding of the effect of credit squeeze after the 2008 
financial crisis on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly firms that are 
discouraged from borrowing. A number of studies have explored the effect of the financial crisis 
on SMEs, indicating that small firms faced particular problems in accessing external finance 
(Vermoesen et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2014; Kremp & Sevestre 2013; Cowling et al., 2012). 
Research also indicates that there is less demand for external finance as a result of the credit 
squeeze (i.e. Cowling et al., 2012; Vermoesen et al., 2013). These studies focus on customers 
who applied for external financing. In the current study; however, the concern is with latent 
demand. The aim is to shed light on the proportion of small firms that hesitate to declare their 
demands known as “Discouraged Borrowers”. These firms are differentiated from other non-
applicants by their desire for credit. They refuse to ask for credit, not because they rely on other 
sources of finance, or they do not need it, but because they fear their applications being turned 
down (Kon and Storey, 2003). Research shows that initial credit squeeze created a rapid increase 
in the rate of discouragement in the UK lending market (Cowling et al., 2016). This research 
tries to understand to what extent this effect lasted.  
Current research regarding the profiles of discouraged borrowers are still scant and there is merit 
in understanding how shocks in the lending market could lead to increased fear of rejection 
among entrepreneurs. The importance of acknowledging discouraged borrowers is twofold: i) 
financiers may lose potential customers, and ii) a good but discouraged borrower relies on 
internal financing, which may limit investment and, subsequently, growth. 
Access to finance is not the only determinant of a firm’s survival or growth (Cressy, 1996), but it 
has been identified as a critical factor for growth (Beck et al., 2005; Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 
2006; Coleman, 2002). As a firm develops and accumulates internal finance, its reliance on 
internal financing for growth diminishes and the use of external financing increases (Rahaman, 
2011). The longer a firm hesitates to declare its financial need, the longer it needs to rely on 
internal financing and the likelihood of abandoning investment projects is greater (Price et al., 
2013). With credit tightening, the gap between the cost of external and internal funds increases 
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(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This affects firms directly through increased financing expenses 
and indirectly through decreased asset values (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Smaller firms are 
less able to compensate with short term financing; therefore, they take cost-cutting measures, 
especially during a recession (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). A proportion of non-applicants, 
however, face self-imposed credit rationing. These firms need capital, but they don’t have the 
confidence to apply for credit.  
With the rise in information asymmetry, more firms are discouraged from applying for external 
financing (Cowling et al., 2016). They do not perceive themselves as good borrowers in the 
lending market. It may be expected that discouragement would decrease as banks resume 
previous levels of credit supply. A key question is by what means do firms respond to the 
improved lending environment and thus display decreased discouragement? Understanding the 
lagged effect of credit improvement on discouragement creates a window of opportunity to 
address higher perceived riskiness and the undeclared demands of firms that are ready to invest 
again.  
To test the research question, 18 waves of UK Surveys of SME Finance Monitor (2011-2016)
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are drawn upon (BDRC Continental, 2016). The surveys collect information about finance 
related activities as well as discouragement. Probit models examine the relationship between the 
probability of discouragement among SMEs and the time passed from the 2008 financial crisis. 
The results of this study show that, ceteris paribus, decrease in discouragement lags 
improvements in lending market conditions. This suggests that SME owners’ or managers’ 
perceptions recover more slowly than the economy. Importantly, the improvement in 
discouragement lags traditional supply side indicators of the health of the small business credit 
market.  
This paper starts off by discussing the situation of small firms during the financial crisis and its 
relation to the theory of discouraged borrower. It then goes on to provide a description of the 
lending market for small firms in the context of this research (the UK at the time of crisis) and is 
followed by the presentation of the data and methodology used to test the research question. 





The Pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) argues that firms, after exhausting internal 
resources, turn to external financing and prefer lower cost external finance: debt financing. 
Banks are the main source of debt finance for small firms (Berger and Udell, 2003). When a firm 
does not have access to finances offered by banks when needed, it may abandon its investment, 
rely on internal sources, or look for more expensive methods of financing. This may impose 
additional barrier to a firm’s growth. Due to higher information opacity, smaller firms are prone 
to tighter access to capital (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). One of the consequence is being more 
susceptible to credit rationing: being denied credit, despite being indistinguishable from good 
borrowers and willing to pay the market price (Parker, 2002). Research on entrepreneurial 
finance shows that some types of small firms may face a higher rejection rate (Freel, 2007; Irwin 
and Scott, 2010), but that the majority receive what they apply for (Fraser, 2004; Vos et al., 
2007). At the time of crisis, SMEs faced a more restricted credit market (BMG Research, 2014), 
but the majority of applicants still did not face absolute credit rationing (Lee et al., 2014). 
Importantly, research shows that a larger proportion of firms are discouraged from applying for 
external finance than that of firms that applied and could not secure any form of finance (Freel et 
al., 2012; Levenson and Willard, 2000). In one UK based study, the number of discouraged firms 
is estimated at twice the level of firms that were rejected
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 (Freel et al., 2012). If discouragement 
is an effective self-rationing mechanism (Han et al., 2009), then mainly bad borrowers will be 
excluded from the market. However, if discouraged firms misjudge their creditworthiness, then 
entrepreneurs decide adversely (Kon and Storey, 2003). In fact, they self-impose credit 
constraints. Given that a large number of firms are discouraged from loan applications, 
“appropriately” or “inappropriately” (Freel et al., 2012, p. 415), there is merit in turning our 
attention to discouraged firms during the aftermath of the credit crisis.  
Based on Kon and Storey’s (2003) model, discouragement is a function of information 
asymmetry, cost of application, and the difference between price of funds at banks and other 
credit institutions. Imperfect supply side information might result from banks not having enough 
information about firms to evaluate applications accurately. As banks accumulate data on their 
customers and build a benchmark for comparing new applications, entrepreneurs must increase 
their efforts in preparing applications. Consequently, both application costs and the fear of being 
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rejected rise. Conversely, firms might not be confident of their prospects. When firms increase 
their information about their own prospects, good borrowers are more likely to apply and bad 
borrowers are more likely to exclude themselves from lending markets. Alternatively, a “two-
sided screening error model” might exist where both these situations are combined.  
The financial crisis and subsequent changes in the economy and in financial markets exacerbated 
imperfect information to both sides. One, the prospects of businesses diminished. And two, 
banks tightened credit to all customers, with small firms being disproportionately penalized 
(Bank of England, 2010; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013). With increased information asymmetry, 
one would expect to observe a higher rate of discouragement among SMEs. Conversely, one 
would expect to detect a lower probability of discouragement when the information opacity 
decreases. Following this one anticipates an inverted U curve in the rate of discouragement 
following the financial crisis. This study seeks to know more about the reaction of the 
entrepreneurs to the fluctuations of information asymmetry in lending market.  
On the side of businesses, the financial crisis of 2008 was followed by increased payment delay, 
insolvency for businesses, reduced demand for loans ((OECD), 2009), and increased rates of 
loan write offs and default (Bank of England, 2009a, 2013). In the UK, Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at constant price dropped in 2008, started recovering in 2009 and reached the pre-
recession level in 2012 (Office for National Statistics, 2016). The percentage of firms that 
experienced growth in employment and turnover, dropped with the onset of the crisis (Cowling 
et al., 2015; IFF Research, 2012). In terms of growth in employment, after the initial fall, SMEs 
have been able to hire more employees since 2009; however, growth in sales did not recover as 
quickly (Cowling et al., 2015). Overall, with improvement in economic conditions, the economic 
climate has not been perceived as a major barrier to firms’ growth since 2012 (BDRC 
Continental, 2015). In short, business prospects diminished with the financial crisis and started to 
recover slowly since 2012.  
In terms of funds loaned, in the aftermath of the financial crisis banks reduced their lending: both 
good and bad borrowers were evaluated with new set of criteria. This could be seen as screening 
error for the customers who were not creditworthy in the aftermath of financial crisis. Therefore, 
the information asymmetry had risen. (Armstrong et al., 2013; Bank of England, 2009b; Cowling 
et al., 2012; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013). Supply, or what banks lent to SMEs showed a decline in 
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application approval rate and a quick recovery; however, demand, or what entrepreneurs ask for, 
declined but did not recover as quickly as the supply side.  
On the supply side, Cowling et al. (2012) noted a drop in the percentage of approved 
applications, and a recovery after 12 months. This, however, was in the face of significant 
decline in demand. From 2009, small firms requiring bank finance were largely able to secure it 
(IFF Research, 2011). Armstrong et al. (2013) observe that the turndown rate did not recover 
until the end 2012; although, the marginal negative effect of time decreased compared to 2008-
2009. As a result, SME owners and managers perceived external financing as less affordable 
(IFF Research, 2012; North et al., 2013; Price et al., 2013). Studies show that firms were more 
susceptible to partial than absolute credit rationing (Kremp and Sevestre, 2013; Lee et al., 2014). 
However, SMEs acknowledged an improvement in the lending environment in 2011 (Bank of 
England, 2011a). In summary, UK-based studies show that starting from 2010, SMEs faced a 
more favourable situation than during 2008-2009.  
The demand side tells a different story. The series of Trend in Lending reports (2009-2013) show 
that the growth rate in net lending for all firms has decreased since the financial crisis, but the 
drop is milder for SMEs. That is likely to be because SMEs did not have access to substitute 
sources such as capital markets (Bank of England, 2009b). Some firms were more resilient at the 
time of financial shock and continued to invest and take advantage of lower interest rates and a 
smaller number of competitors (Kitching et al., 2009; Price et al., 2013).  In spite of these, the 
growth of net lending to SMEs is negative from the end of 2009 till 2013 (Bank of England, 
2013) . The recovery of demand in SMEs was slower than in larger firms. While demand for all 
firms rose from 2010, SMEs still decreased their use of bank loans. Interestingly, smaller firms 
(firms with less than £1M annual sales) experienced a sharp negative growth rate without 
recovery from 2010-2012 (Bank of England, 2012). In short, the demand side did not recover as 
quickly as the supply side.  
This unwillingness to invest is also reflected in the rise of the proportion of discouraged 
borrowers towards the end of the recessionary period, “…suggesting that initially entrepreneurs 
anticipated that the supply of loans would not diminish too much, and only when it became clear 
that banks were rationing credit persistently did entrepreneurs become disillusioned about 
applying for loans” (Cowling et al., 2016, p. 20). A comparison of the characteristics of 
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discouraged borrowers and firms whose loan applications were declined shows that a significant 
proportion of discouraged firms would likely have been approved, if they had applied (Cole and 
Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016). In 2010, UK banks resumed the previous lending criteria, 
the turndown rate recovered (Cowling et al., 2012), and the majority of firms were able to secure 
finance. As firms’ confidence in the banking system and macroeconomic factors improved, they 
increased their demand for credit (Bank of England, 2009b). Following this, it is expected that 
discouraged firms should also perceive these positive signs and discouragement should decline 
as the economy improves. 
The importance in understating the lagged effect of the credit squeeze on discouragement is in 
acknowledging the higher perceived riskiness of the businesses. With the recovery in the supply 
side, the sooner the firms reassess their perceptions of risk at banks and apply for bank loans, the 
faster they will have access to the growth funds.  
3-Data and methodology 
The data used in this study are a series of cross section surveys drawn from the UK Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprise Finance Monitor, 2011-2016 (BDRC Continental, 2016). The survey is 
conducted quarterly and collects information on SME financing. The unit of analysis is firm with 
less than 250 employees and/or £35 Million annual sale. The sample is initially provided by Dun 
& Bradstreet and Experian and is structured across all sizes, sectors, and regions. Data is 
provided on a 10-wave basis. Therefore, in order to have all the waves, the first and last available 
datasets were combined and the sampling weights were adjusted. The sample used in this study 
covers the first and second quarter of 2011 (combined) until the end of 2015. Each wave contains 
around five thousand observations, giving a sample size of ninety five thousand firms. Without 
applying sampling weights, the sample is biased towards larger firms. Employing sampling 
weights, the final sample is representative of 4.5 million SMEs in the UK (BDRC Continental, 
2014).  
The respondents to the surveys are the persons in charge of the financing decisions of the firms 
(the owner or principal manager). Each survey collects information via telephone interviews on 
the usage, application, or alteration of loan and overdraft facilities. Moreover, the sample 
provides information on the size and age of the firms, sector, legal status, geographical location, 
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as well as entrepreneur’s age, financial certification, and gender. Data on innovation, exporting, 
credit risk, and using other financial facilities is available. The definition of all variables used in 
this study is presented in table 1.  
The Probit model is used in this study to suit the binary dependent variables. As discouragement 
was only measured for firms that expressed a need for credit at the time of survey, the analysis is 
prone to selection bias. Firms that did not desire credit are not considered in the sub-sample. To 
attempt to control for this potential bias, a Heckman (1979) two-stage model was estimated by 
considering the probability of neediness for credit for all firms. In the first stage, the probability 
of neediness for credit is modeled through business size, age, legal status, industry, and growth 
intention. Growth intention is the discriminatory variable that is expected to explain desire for 
credit, but not discouragement. The Inverse Mill’s ratio of this model is incorporated in the 
model of interest. However, it was not significant in any of the models. Therefore, the results of 
one stage Probit model is presented in table 2.  
In addition to discouragement model, a rejection model is also included in the analysis. Previous 
research shows that after 2010 the lending criteria resumes for lending to smaller firms (Cowling 
et al., 2012) ; therefore, it is expected that time is not associated with the rejection rate after this 
year. The rejection models control for this assumption.  
 
3-1- Dependent variable 
Discouraged borrowers, in this study, are small firms that desire capital but do not apply for 
loans specifically due to the fear of being declined. Some firms need capital but avoid applying 
for bank loans for other reasons such as securing the money from other sources, not preferring 
borrowing, not having the time or knowledge to complete applications, or not wanting to commit 
to the conditions of borrowing. These firms are not identified as discouraged borrowers. Among 
the non-users with a desire for credit, discouraged borrowers are those who didn’t apply to the 
bank only because they “thought”: they would be turned down, that it was not the right time to 
borrow, or that banks were not lending. The dependent variable takes the value ‘1’ if the firm is a 
discouraged borrower and zero if they needed capital and they could secure funds. Overall, 7568 
firms showed a desire for loans, among which 1657 were discouraged. After employing sample 
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weights, only 7.1% of the population needed credit and, among these firms, one third applied for 
a loan and one third feared rejection (2.1% of population). Among firms who needed credit, the 
proportion of discouraged firms decreased since 2012. To understand to what extent these 
changes are significant and not due to changes in firms’ and entrepreneurs’ demographics, a 
multivariate analysis is presented.  
 
  3-2- Independent variable 
A categorical variable captures the year in which the surveys were conducted. The reference year 
in each analysis is 2010, noting that the 2011 surveys enquire about the financing practices 
during 2010. Therefore, the study investigates the change in discouragement from 2010 to 2014. 
There are similar surveys on SME financing in the UK for 2007, 2008, and 2009. However, the 
differences in the definition of discouragement and the range of years each survey covered did 
not allow for combining surveys and examining the trend of discouragement before and after the 
crisis. To this end, reliance is on the most recent research in the UK context by Cowling et al. 
(2016) that reported a sharp increase in the rate of discouragement at the end of financial crisis.  
 
3-3 Control variables: 
As discouragement is a function of imperfect information, to separate the effect of time passed 
from the credit squeeze, variables associated with information asymmetry between banks and 
small firms are included in the multivariate models. The first group of control variables belongs 
to the entrepreneur. In this study, holding a financial qualification and the entrepreneur’s age are 
used as proxies for the entrepreneur’s education and experience. Although education is not 
shown to have a relationship with difficulty in raising finance (Irwin and Scott, 2010), it affects 
the prospect of the firm (Westhead and Storey, 1995). Less experienced entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be discouraged in the lending market (Han et al., 2009). However, Cowling et al (2016) 
found that during a recessionary period, more experienced and educated entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be "realistic” and refrain from applying to banks. Female entrepreneurs demand less 
credit (Cowling et al., 2012). This could be explained through lower confidence in approval of 
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their application and more inclination to avoid extra risk and control over business 
(Constantinidis et al., 2006; Watson et al., 2009).  
The second group of control variables relates to structural risk: firms age and size. Both of these 
variables are recognized for their effects on credit rationing and discouragement. The larger and 
more established a firm is, the less likely it is to face difficulty in raising finance (Beck et al., 
2005; Binks and Ennew, 1996; Cassar, 2004; Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Freel et al., 2012; 
Han et al., 2009; Vos et al., 2007). The probability of discouragement decreases as firms grow in 
size (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Freel et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009). The higher level of 
discouragement in smaller and younger firms may also be attributed to the more limited 
relationship they have with their banks (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013). Larger firms were less 
likely than SMEs to face application turndown during the crisis. Therefore, it is expected that 
they experience less fear of being declined. In addition, firm size and age may determine the 
performance, and consequently, the “serviceability” of the firms at the time of crisis (Cowling et 
al., 2015; Peric and Vitezic, 2016).  
The dataset contains credit risk ratings for the firms. The sample providers input risk ratings. A 
categorical variable is used to classify low, medium, and high-risk firms. The findings of Han et 
al. (2009) show those riskier borrowers are more likely to be discouraged having controlled for 
key characteristics of the business and the entrepreneurs. This is also in line with the finding of 
Cowling et al. (2016) for the UK market during the recessionary period. Inclusion of credit risk 
in the model is an attempt to control for the effect of unobserved variables such as assets (Berger 
and Udell, 2006; Robb and Robinson, 2014). 
Beside structural risk, some degree of higher information opacity is attributed to the firm’s 
strategy. Exporting firms are better able to diversify their sources of financing through national 
and international channels and they have superior performance to generate significant cash flow 
(Ponikvar et al., 2013). Thus, it is possible that exporting decreases discouragement through 
better serviceability and financing options. The effect of innovation on discouragement could be 
through large sunk cost in the face of an uncertain outcome. Higher information opacity of 
innovative firms are reflected in higher application turndown rates (Freel, 2007; Lee et al., 2014; 
North et al., 2013) and higher loan prices (Nitani and Riding, 2013). In addition, legal status 
might influence the entrepreneur’s perception about the credibility of the business.  
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The next group of variables measures the information banks have about the performance of the 
entrepreneur. Two dummy variables are included in the model to specify whether the firms use 
credit card and overdraft facilities (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016). It is hoped that inclusion of these 
variables could partially control for the amount of information banks have about their customers. 
In addition, whether a firm banks with more than one financial institution is considered in the 
data. It is expected that the more resources that are available to entrepreneurs, the less likely it is 
that they will feel discouragement (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016). Firms were also asked how 
satisfied they are with their relationship with their banks. It is expected the more satisfied 
customers show less discouragement.  
Performance of the firms in the year prior to the time of survey is also included. Firms that 
perform better in terms of revenue and profit, are more likely to consider themselves 
creditworthy and less likely to be discouraged (Xiang et al., 2015). A dummy variable is 
included to report whether the firm was profitable in the last year or not. In addition, a 
categorical variable measures the annual sale turnover of firms.  
The industry in which the firm operates might influence business prospects. Before the crisis, 
growing firms could be found indiscriminately across all the industries. However, the financial 
crisis affected firms heterogeneously (Cowling et al., 2015; Peric and Vitezic, 2016). For 
example, in the UK, the largest decline in sales and employment happened to manufacturing and 
construction firms, respectively (Cowling et al., 2015). In addition, some sectors such as 
manufacturing have more assets to be pledged as collateral; therefore, they may have different 
financing needs (Johnsen, 2005). A firm’s region is also included to account for differences in 
shared information between banks and their customers (Rauterkus and Munchus, 2014). 
LIBOR
3
 interest rate for GBP was initially considered a proxy for the costs of borrowing. Cost of 
borrowing is shown to be associated with discouragement (Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). All the 
indices tried in the analysis were highly correlated with time (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). To 
account for the change in the price of the loan and avoid multicollinearity problem, the change in 
LIBOR interest rate is included in the model. The difference is measured by the change in the 
average rate from 12 months prior to survey to the end of the quarter in which the survey is 
conducted. Both overnight and 12-month rates are considered in the analysis and the results are 





3-4 Descriptive statistics: 
The proportion of discouraged borrowers during the crisis is presented in figure 1
5
. Combining 
with the finding of Cowling et al. (2016), the trend of discouragement in the UK market follows 
an inverted U curve. The highest rate of discouragement is 3.2% of population in 2011 (about 
147 thousand firms). This figure drops in 2012 and reaches 1.2% in 2014. 
--Insert figure 1 about here-- 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the total sample, firms that need, and those that did 
not need loans. For the firms that needed loans, the descriptive statistics for applicants and 
discouraged firms are presented. After incorporating sampling weights, 30% of the firms in the 
sample are in manufacturing and construction sectors (Production). Around 20% of the firms are 
start-ups with less than 2 years of activities. Firms with no paid employees comprise 74% of the 
sample. Only 0.5% of firms have more than 50 employees. These figures are close to population 
estimates (BDRC Continental, 2014).  
--Insert table 1 about here-- 
A comparison among different groups of firms that needed loan shows that discouraged firms are 
smaller and younger firms. With an increase in credit risk level, the proportion of discouraged 
firms increases. In terms of firm strategies, exporting and innovating firms show more desire for 
credit and less discouragement. Women appear to be less in need of loans, but they make up a 
higher proportion of discouraged firms. Lower annual sales associate with a higher likelihood of 
being discouraged. The use of credit cards, overdrafts, and working with more than one bank are 
associated with a smaller proportion of discouraged firms.  
5- Main results and discussions 
Table 2 shows the results of Probit regressions in one-stage models for: discouraged firms versus 
applicants; and rejected firms versus approved firms. In each panel, two models are presented. 
The first model includes the basic demographic variables and the second model includes risk 
related variables as well as variables concerned with the banking relationship and firm 
performance. The number of observations is lower for the second model due to missing values. 
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The total number of observations for discouragement model is 7413 and 6056 in model 1 and 2, 
respectively, representing 319,000 and 238,000 firms.  
--Insert table 2 about here-- 
Looking at the coefficients of the variable of interest (i.e. year) in the regression results, it is 
clear that discouragement decreases over time. The effect of time is significant for years 2013 
and 2014. That is, the level of discouragement is significantly lower in 2013 than it was in 2010. 
Although not significant, the coefficient for 2011 is positive, suggesting that the “scarring effect” 
(Cowling et al., 2012, p. 796) of financial crisis on entrepreneurs was being intensified at that 
time. From 2012, the coefficient turns negative, but the influence only becomes significant in 
2013. In summary, accounting for the variations of control variables, the probability of 
discouragement follows an inverted U curve over time. Also, the decrease in discouragement 
lagged the signals of improvements in lending markets (in 2010). 
There are some interesting findings among the other variables. Unexpectedly, business age in 
model 2 is not a significant variable in predicting the probability of discouragement. Further tests 
show that in the absence of risk rating, age is a significant variable for firms with more than 10 
years of activity compared to start-ups. Although the calculation of credit risk provided by 
sample providers is not known, it seems it is related to business age. Similar findings are also 
presented in Han et al. (2009) where business age is not a significant variable in the presence of 
credit risk rating. As the firm grows in employment it becomes increasingly less likely to be 
discouraged. The effect of size is in line with the findings of previous studies (Chakravarty and 
Xiang, 2013; Freel et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009).  
Risk rating does not appear to affect the likelihood of discouragement in the full model. Further 
tests show high risk firms are more likely to be discouraged than low risk firms; however, the 
inclusion of sales and profits mask the effect of risk rating. In the full model, profitable firms are 
less likely to be discouraged. In addition, the more sales a firm generates, the lower the 
probability of discouragement. This suggests that discouragement seems to act as an efficient 
tool dispersing high-risk businesses from banks. Nonetheless, this does not suggest that risk is a 
key determinant of discouragement. Evidence shows that businesses with low and medium risk 
profiles are also discouraged from applying.  
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As a robustness check, a rejection model is evaluated to test whether the fear of being rejected is 
objective. In this phase, absolute credit rationing from a bank loan is considered as the dependent 
variable. A dummy variable is set to 1 if an application is totally turned down and zero if the 
applicant could secure some loan from a bank. Using the same control variables, a Probit model 
shows that the probability of application turndown does not change over time (consistent in both 
models). The fear of rejection seems to be more connected with decreased loanable funds to 
SMEs, increased application turndown in 2008-2009, and the associated downturn in business 
prospects. In addition, larger and older firms are less likely to face rejection (in model 1). Firms 
with higher risk rating are more likely to face rejection than low risk firms. Firms that are 
satisfied with their relationship with their banks face lower probability of rejection, although the 
satisfaction might be the result of the approved application.  
 
6- Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is the investigation of the changes in the level of discouragement 
during the aftermath of the recession and after UK banks resumed pre-recession loan approval 
practices. The results show that lower probability of discouragement among SMEs lags the 
improvement in SMEs’ access to bank funds. The results highlight the longer-term effect of 
tightened credit supply on SMEs that are ready to invest, but hold back because of fear of 
rejection.  
The analysis shows that when the information asymmetry has risen between two parties, the 
amelioration does not happen quickly. This is of importance, because entrepreneurs hold back 
from applying for bank loans despite the fact that banks started to evaluate the application with 
pre-crisis criteria shortly after the credit squeeze. In fact, the probability of application turndown 
was not associated with time (within the years under investigation). However, the probability of 
discouragement still rose after improvement in the lending market and recovered slowly 
afterwards. The existence of a mismatch in perception between banks and entrepreneurs seems to 
hold back firms from seeking external finance (British Business Bank, 2016). 
In a recessionary period, SMEs’ perception of lack of support, as mentioned by Hutton and 
Nightingale (2011), leads “to significant numbers of discouraged borrowers” and, subsequently, 
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a “… lack of investment leads to reduced levels of innovation in the economy, and thus a self-
reinforcing cycle of less innovation, less investment and less dynamism…”(Hutton and 
Nightingale, 2011a, p. 8).  Discouragement in the EU region is estimated to lower investment 
growth, employment growth and total asset growth in the following years since recession 
(Ferrando and Mulier, 2015). In the UK, recent empirical work shows a significant amount of 
underinvestment from SME’s during the recessionary period (Cowling et al., 2016). To alleviate 
this effect and induce more investment among SMEs, addressing the concerns of discouraged 
borrowers may be an important starting point. They are ready for investment. 
The merits of acknowledging the lagged response of entrepreneurs to health indicators of 
financing market is in planning policy measures to deal with the lack of demands. The presence 
of ‘good’ borrowers among discouraged firms signals the imperfect flow of information in the 
market. If ‘good’ borrowers do not recover their confidence in the banking system, with the 
increase in supply, the chance of bank’s adverse selection and over-investment is likely to 
increase, raising application costs for all.  
Discouragement, especially for the firms that are discouraged “inappropriately”, is a function of 
information asymmetry between SMEs and banking market. There are several programs 
addressing the supply-side of lending and equity markets ((BIS), 2013) that set out to help SMEs 
address potential funding gaps. For example, to stimulate supply after the recession, a 
commitment between UK major banks and the UK government, known as Project Merlin
6
, 
aimed to encourage banks to lend more to small businesses. There are also other government 
schemes that aim to help SMEs with external finance
7
. BMG Research (2013) argues that only a 
small number of SMEs are aware of government financial support schemes, such as the National 
Loan Guarantee Scheme. Entrepreneurs’ awareness of new methods of finance such as venture 
capital funds, business angels, crowd funding, and mezzanine finance is increasing, but the usage 
of these methods is still low (British Business Bank, 2016). Moreover, the amount of time that 
the majority of entrepreneurs spend on the decision and application for external finance, often 
limited to their main banks, is minimal (BMG Research, 2013).  Many entrepreneurs think the 
credit granting decision is totally computer-based (Fraser, 2014). Whilst, the majority of 
applications made to banks are being funded, SME owners are still avoiding banks due to the 
psychic pressure of possible rejection (BMG Research, 2013). Fraser (2014) notes that 
16 
 
entrepreneurs are heavily influenced by their adverse experiences with banks, but that they are 
poorly informed about alternative opportunities. An initiative that tries to address the pressure 
and stigma of rejection might be the setup of an “Appeals Process” by British Banker’s 
Association in April 2011. In this forum, SMEs that are not satisfied by the lending process have 
the opportunity to voice their concerns. However, no study has yet discussed the merits of such 
programs. It seems much of the information asymmetry between borrowers (including 
discouraged ones) and banks is related to entrepreneurs being less informed about the current 
state of the banking system and their own prospects. On the other hand, lack of communications 
between SMEs and banks, centralized banking systems and procedures make it difficult for 
banks to adapt to their SME needs (Silver and Vegholm, 2009).  
To alleviate this problem, government can play an intermediary role through subsidized services 
and business supports already in place. The psychic pressure of search for finance and 
application costs is harder to address than the objective costs (Xiang et al., 2015). While there 
are initiatives addressing SME “investment-readiness” (Mason, 2009), more attention towards 
debt financing is merited (Freel et al., 2012; Rostamkalaei and Freel, 2016). Disseminating 
information related to improvements in credit supply, the lending process and criteria, and “ex-
post counselling” (Xiang et al., 2015, p. 16) through advisory services may mitigate the 
entrepreneur’s fear of rejection at banks. This may also help entrepreneurs to assess their 
riskiness more objectively and increase their efforts to address these risks through better quality 
applications. In light of this, banks serve as a good channel for transferring such information 
through relational lending.  
Relational lending appears to ameliorate the problem of imperfect information. Discouragement 
works as an efficient tool when the length of relationship between banks and SMEs increases 
(Han et al., 2009): low risk customers are less discouraged and high risk customers become more 
“pessimistic” about their applications. In the time of crisis, relational banking and a strong bond 
between banks and SMEs became more important for smaller firms (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; 
Cowling et al., 2016; Durkin et al., 2013). The dataset on hand was not competent to control for 
the length of firms’ relationship with their main bank. Nonetheless, it is hoped to capture some of 
the effect of shared information by the inclusion of business age, risk rating, level of customers’ 
satisfaction with main bank and use of other financial tools. With a more comprehensive dataset 
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or qualitative studies, one might scrutinize how the exchange of information between banks and 
customers may, more quickly, restore pre-crisis confidence. 
                                                          
1 https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/ 
2 According to Cowling et al. (2016), in 2008 2.65% of population of SMEs are discouraged. This figure in 2005 is 8.1% in Freel 
et al (2012) with a different survey. The estimations of proportion of discouraged firms vary across different countries and 
methods of measurement (Chakravarty and Xiang, 2013; Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Cowling et al., 2016; Ferrando and Mulier, 
2015). 
3 http://www.global-rates.com/interest-rates/libor/british-pound-sterling/british-pound-sterling.aspx 
4 Ethnic minorities are also more prone to discouragement (Han et al., 2009). In the current data; however, the ethnicity is 
missing for 50% of the responses. Therefore, it is not included in the analysis 
5 In the calculations of Cowling et al. (2016), discouraged borrowers are defined as firms that avoid applying for loans due to 
fear of rejection and high costs of application. As a robustness check, entrepreneurs who were discouraged from applying due to 
concerns over the high cost of application are also considered in the definition of discouraged borrowers. The result of the 
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Table 1- Definition of variables and descriptive statistics- Percentage (weighted analysis) 















Number of observation 95,273 87,704 7568   3789 1657   
Population size 4,548K 4,226K 32K  115K 95K  
Weighted percentage (of population) 100% 92.90% 7.10%   2.55% 2.09%   
Size  Measured by number of 
employees, categorical 
variable 
       
0 0.740 0.747 0.660 *** 0.572 0.724 *** 
1 to 9  0.221 0.215 0.298 *** 0.361 0.253 *** 
10 to 49  0.031 0.031 0.036 *** 0.055 0.020 *** 
50 to 250 0.005 0.006 0.005 * 0.010 0.002 *** 
Business age Measured by years from 
establishment, categorical 
variable 
       
<2 years 0.200 0.195 0.263 *** 0.234 0.310 *** 
2 to 9 years 0.369 0.368 0.386 *** 0.340 0.410 *** 
>10 years 0.430 0.436 0.351 *** 0.425 0.279 *** 
Sole Proprietorship  Legal status dummy (0,1) 0.653 0.657 0.605 *** 0.525 0.692 *** 
female  Gender dummy (0,1) 0.219 0.220 0.196 *** 0.185 0.204 *** 
owner's age Entrepreneur’s age, 
categorical variable 
       
less than 30 0.068 0.067 0.085 *** 0.084 0.084  
30-50 0.501 0.498 0.540 *** 0.531 0.563 *** 
50-65 0.358 0.360 0.328 *** 0.335 0.322 *** 
>65 0.071 0.073 0.045 *** 0.048 0.029 *** 
Industry Sector dummy, categorical 
variable 
       
Agriculture 0.043 0.042 0.046 *** 0.064 0.034 *** 
Production 0.290 0.291 0.266 *** 0.263 0.286 *** 
Retail 0.192 0.189 0.238 *** 0.243 0.242  
Hotels and 
restaurant 
0.034 0.032 0.051 *** 0.062 0.048 *** 
Real Estate 0.262 0.265 0.226 *** 0.204 0.218 *** 
Health and social 
work 
0.177 0.178 0.170 *** 0.161 0.169 *** 
Location Location of the firm, 
categorical variable 
       
London 0.170 0.167 0.196 *** 0.172 0.200 *** 
Southeast 0.160 0.160 0.152 *** 0.141 0.163 *** 
Rest of the UK 0.670 0.671 0.651 *** 0.686 0.636 *** 
Financial training  Entrepreneur with financial 
training dummy (0,1) 
0.252 0.250 0.275 *** 0.299 0.255 *** 
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Export  Exporting firm dummy (0,1) 0.083 0.081 0.110 *** 0.108 0.103 *** 
Innovation  Process and/or product 
innovator firm in the last 
three yrs (0,1) 
0.381 0.372 0.506 *** 0.531 0.473 *** 
Risk 
a
 Credit risk rating, categorical 
variable (provided by sample 
providers) 
       
Low risk 0.194 0.198 0.140 *** 0.207 0.089 *** 
Medium risk 0.308 0.311 0.276 *** 0.282 0.253 *** 
High risk 0.496 0.489 0.582 *** 0.510 0.656 *** 
Sale 
a
 Last year sale turnover in 
GBP, categorical variable 
       
<50K 0.618 0.622 0.570 *** 0.452 0.675 *** 
50-100K 0.170 0.170 0.166 *** 0.180 0.151 *** 
100-500K 0.138 0.135 0.173 *** 0.232 0.115 *** 
500-1M 0.033 0.032 0.041 *** 0.055 0.030 *** 
1-5M 0.033 0.032 0.041 *** 0.067 0.024 *** 
>5M 0.006 0.006 0.006  0.012 0.002 *** 
profit 
a
 Firm showing profit in the 
last year (0,1) 
0.733 0.743 0.613 *** 0.705 0.523 *** 
Relationship with 
main bank 
Firm’s level of satisfaction 
with relationship with the 
main bank, categorical 
variable 
       
Not-Satisfied 0.094 0.079 0.295 *** 0.306 0.303  
Neither 0.090 0.087 0.129 *** 0.099 0.156 *** 
Satisfied 0.815 0.833 0.574 *** 0.594 0.539 *** 
Credit card  Firm using credit card (0,1) 0.168 0.160 0.267 *** 0.326 0.236 *** 
Overdraft  Firm using overdraft (0,1) 0.192 0.180 0.344 *** 0.416 0.306 *** 




Firm banking with more than 
one bank (0,1) 
0.015 0.012 0.045 *** 0.064 0.040 *** 
*, **, *** significant at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01  
a Number of observations is different due to missing values. 
b There is a third group of firms that desire credit that are included in this analysis. These firms refrain from applying for bank 
loan because of reasons other than fear of being rejected by banks. 
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Table 2- The results of multivariate analysis- weighted analysis 
  Discouragement =1 (vs. Applicant=0) Rejection=1(vs. Approved=0) 
  Model 1   Model 2 Model 1   Model 2 




      
    




























2013 -0.34 * 0.17 
 







2014 -0.4 ** 0.17 
 









: zero employees 
      
    
     
  















0.164 -0.57 *** 0.14 
 
-0.56 *** 0.19 
More than 50 -1.1 *** 0.16 
 
-0.589 ** 0.249 -1.01 *** 0.18 
 




      
    
     
  





































: less than 30 
      
    
     
  











50 to 65 years 0.371 ** 0.19 
 

















































































      
    
     
  
Production 0.421 *** 0.15 
 
0.44 ** 0.184 0.54 *** 0.16 
 
0.458 ** 0.21 
Retail 0.329 ** 0.16 
 
0.4154 ** 0.192 0.495 *** 0.18 
 
0.417 * 0.22 




0.198 0.581 *** 0.18 
 
0.451 * 0.23 
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Real Estate 0.49 *** 0.17 
 
0.5117 *** 0.194 0.398 ** 0.18 
 
0.433 * 0.22 




0.226 0.436 ** 0.22 
 
0.551 ** 0.28 
Location, Ref
 a
: rest of the UK 
      
    









































: Low risk 
      
    
     
  
Medium risk 
    
0.0299 
 
0.15   





    
0.1876 
 
0.143   








      
    
     
  
Satisfied 
    
-0.293 
 
0.166   
   
-0.85 *** 0.19 
Not satisfied 
    
-0.306 
 
0.178   




Use of credit card 
b
 
    
-0.152 
 
0.112   




Use of overdraft 
b
 
    
-0.115 
 
0.108   
   
-0.32 ** 0.12 
More than one bank 
b
 
    
-0.354 
 
0.235   







    
-0.376 *** 0.11   
   
-0.35 *** 0.13 
Sale, Ref
 a
: less than 50 K 
      
    
     
  
50K to 100 K 
    
-0.286 * 0.157   




100 K to 500 K 
    
-0.544 *** 0.14   




500K to 1M 
    
-0.401 ** 0.195   




1M to 5M 
    
-0.591 *** 0.211   




More than 5M 
    
-0.78 ** 0.355   
















   
6056 
 
  3124 




Population size 319K 
   
238K 
 
  97K 




P>F 0       0     0       0     
*, **, *** significant at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 
a REF is the reference for categorical variables. 




Figure 1- Percentage of discouraged firms in the UK populations of SMEs 
 
 
 
